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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ABATEMENT AND, REVIVAL-PENDENCY or ANOTHER AcTIoN GROUND FOR
DisMissm.-Plaintiff brought an action in B county to recover damages as
the result of a collision between his truck and defendants automobile. The
defendant had previously brought an action in P county, where he resided,
against the plaintiff, for damages arising out of the same collision, which
action was pending when the latter was begun. Defendant filed a plea
setting up the pendency of his own action in P county and moved to dismiss
plaintiff's action. Motion denied. Defendant appealed. Held, the action
should have been dismissed. Allen v. Salley (N. C., 'gig), iox S. E. 545.
The court rested their decision upon the supposition that only one cause
of action existed, as there was only one transaction. If this be conceded
the conclusion reached by the court is logical. It is a well settled general
principle of the law that the pendency of a prior action for the same cause,
between the same parties, in a court of competent jurisdiction, will abate
a later action in the same court or in another court of the same jurisdiction.
I CoRus JuRIs 45; N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 96 U. S. 588, 24
L. ed. 737; Spencer v. Johnston, 58 Neb. 44, 78 N. W. 482. In some jurisdic-
tions this doctrine is expressly recognized by statute. Ga. Civ. Code, sec.
443r; N. Y. Civ. Code Proc., sec. 498; Minn. Rev. Laws (igo5) sec. 4128.
But these decisions and statutes contemplate the identity of the actions and
not separate and distinct actions. Such provisions do not change the existing
rules for determining the identity of causes of action. Paige v. Wilson, 8
Bosw. (N.Y.) 294; Julian v. Pitcher, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 254. In the principal
case part of the argument is based upon the assumption that there, was only
one action. But although there was only one transaction, one collision, it does
not necessarily follow that only one cause of action arose. A separate and
distinct cause of action inight arise to each party. Either party might sue.
Bell v. Hansley, 48 N. C. 13i. That this objection was not wholly unobserved
by the court is shown by the repeated references in the opinion of the prin-
cipal case, to the doctrine of counterclaims, citing Francis v. Edwards, 77 N.
C. 275, as holding that "a counterclaim is a distinct and independent cause
of action." But if either party might sue because of the collision,.and if the
other migh .file a counterclaim, which is a "separate and distinct cause of
action," then there must exist two separate actions, which are not identical.
It seems therefore that the court went astray in their argument and the
authorities that they cite. The result of this decision might properly have
been reached under a statute requiring consolidation of such actions. There
would then have been a consolidation and not a dismissal. A dismissal
might also have been had under a statute forfeiting counterclaims when not
pleaded as such. See Laws of Utah (I9O7), sec. 2970; Montana Revised
Code (907), sec. 6547. No such statutes appear to exist in North Carolina.
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Al.:N N--T1.xL-\' -'l'i:.i 'ri'- lminigration Act, (39 St:at. 875, c. 2,
s. 3, C1,1p Slat. ,. 42891.i)) exchlding contract laborers. but providing that
such prosiins "'shall not he held to exclude 'persons belonging to any
IecoIni7Cd learned profession."" Itcid, not to exclude Japanese alien, seeking
admission for the purpose of teaching the Japanese language, history, etc., in
an established school. Ku-'abara v. U. S., (C. C. A., 9th Circ., 1919) 260
Fed. io4.
The Exclusion Act in question provides that skilled or unskilled contract
labor of any kind shall be excluded, but going further it makes certain specific
exceptions. The historical basis for the first and succeeding Exclusion Acts
as well as their underlying policy, is laid down in Church of Holy Trinity v.
U. S., 143 U. S. 457, 463. Since this kind of legislation has always stated
its general policy and later made specific exceptions, it has been the policy
of the courts to construe it strictly, and apply its provisions only to cases
clearly within its terms and spirit, each law or treaty being construed as a
whole. Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. L'. S., 13 Ariz. 388, (aff. 213 U. S. 647).
In the principal case, the court held that the plaintiff was not within the ban
of the statute, because he was in the excepted class, "recognized learned
profession," and because to teach is not to labor within the meaning of the
statute. And a chemist is a person within the same class, U. S. v. Laws, 163
U. S. 258; but an expert accountant is not, In. re Ellis, 124 Fed. 637. Evidently
this distinction between skilled labor and "recognized learned profession"
is necessarily far from precise, for a given learned profession and a given
trade might well partake each of some characteristics of the other. The
court in U. S. v.-Lazvs, supra, p. 266, seeks to lay down a distinction, "Pro-
fession implies professed attainments in special knowledge, as distinguished
from mere skill;-a practical dealing with affairs, as distingushed from mere
study or investigation; and an application of such knowledge to uses for
others as avocation, as distinguished from its own pursuits for its own pur-
poses." Tested thus by this rule which while sounding academic really
furnishes a practical test, the decision of the court in the principal case,
reversing the decision of the District Court of U. S. for Dist. of Hawaii,
where the case arose, was fundamentally sound.
ALIeNs-NATURALIZATION-ANARCHISTs.-In a suit to cancel the natural-
ization certificate of one Stuppiello, on the ground that he was an anarchist
within the .Immigration Statutes, when it was issued, because ha believed
in the absence of all government as a political ideal, and sought the same end
through propaganda, so that his certificate was procured by fraud and was in
violation of the Act June 29, 19o6, Sec. 7 (Comp. Stat. Sec. 4363), held, can-
cellation should be decreed. U. S. v. Stuppiello, (D. C., W. D. N. Y., i9'g)
26o Fed. 483.
The language of the act is, "anarchists, or persons who believe in or advo-
cate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States or of all Government or of all forms of law * * *" The belief in such
theories, or the advocacy by philosophical anarchists of the overthrow of
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government not by forcible means, but by the propagation of their theories
comes within the spirit if not the letter of the act. And it is not an uncon-
stitutional infringement of free speech, for while the Federal Constitution
guarantees freedom of speech, it does not by this guaranty contemplate
unrestrained, unlimited freedom of speech, and in the light of the principal
case this holds good for two constitutional reasons: first, the Congress has
full power over naturalization and may impose such conditions as it sees
fit; second, all Government has an inherent right to protect itself, and pro-
hibit any words which strike at its very foundation. U. S. v. Williams, 194
U. S. 279, by.a very clear dictum the court intimated that just such persons
could be excluded, as within the Immigration Act. So decided, Lopec v.
Howe, 259 Fed. 401 (May, i919), "the fact that he is only a philosophical
anarchist and not an advocate of a resort to force and revolution makes him,
in the eyes of Congress, none the less a dangerous presence. His theories,
if put into practice, would end the Government of the United States." In the
eyes of our government, then, the dissemination of ideas of philosophical
anarchy is so inimical to our organized government as to be similar to
treason. But aside from this, the court in Lopez v. Howe, 259 Fed. 401,
states tl. true Constitutional theory, "while the student of social science
may distrininate between philosophical anarchists and other kinds of anar-
chists, the act of Congress under consideration does not; and no such dis-
crimination is necessary, for the constitutional power to exclude or deport
does not depend upon whether the alien is or is not a criminal, or the advocate
of lawless ideas."
CARRIERs-LTABILITY-LIMiTATION UNDER CARMACK AMENDMENT.-Goods
were shipped from Yokohama, Japan, to New York City, under a bill of
lading agreeing that the goods are valued at not exceeding $ioo per pack-
age. The consignee sues the inland carriers by whom the goods were trans-
ported from San Francisco to New York to recover the invoice value,
$17,549.01. Defendant carriers admit liability of $5,6oo, i. e. $ioo on each
56 cases. Held, liable for full invoice value. Burke v. Union Pacific R. Co.,(N. Y., r9i9) 124 N. E. Ii9.
The goods were shipped March 10, 7915, and the Cummins Amendment
did not become operative till June 2, and so the liability is fixed by the Car-
mack Amendment. See 15 MicH. L.-REv. 314; ii Id. 46o. The ocean trans-
portation not being within the Carmack amendment was under the bill of
lading. But the inland transportation was under the so-called straight uni-
form bill of lading by force of classifications filed with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. This provides that .the amount of any kiss shall be
computed on the bona fide invoice price, unless a lower value has been
represented in writing by the snipper, or has been agreed to or is determined
by the classification or tariffs upon which the rate is based. The court found
only one rate fixed under such a bill of.lading, and hence no choice was
offered to the shipper of a lower rate on a released liability. There was,
therefore, no estoppel against him to claim the higher valuation. The facts
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show, however, that the tariffs showed a charge ten per cent higher for
assuming liability as imposed by the common law, than for tha. subjcct to all
the terms of the uniform bill of lading.
It may be doubted whether the-Federal Supreme Court will agree with
the instant case, though a distinction may be made in such case as C. N. 0. &
T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, on the ground that the bill of lading
there expressly recited two alternate rates based on different values. It is
notable that the instant case was decided in New York, which has been
cxtreme in interpreting contracts in favor of the carrier. See 8 MICH. L. Rzv.
531, 9 Id. 233.
CARRIERS-PERSONAL ASSISTANCE TO ALIGHTING PASSENGE-The plain-
tiff, a female passenger on the defendant's road, slipped and fell while de-
scending the car steps with a satchel and was injured. She alleged that the
fall was occasioned, first, by a failure of the defendant's employees to take
her satchel and carry it down the steps for her, and to ass;st her down, and
secondly, by reason of the fact that the step rubber was worn smooth. She
did not request any assistance, although several employees were present and
saw her start to descend. The case was submitted to the jury on both of
the above issues of negligence, and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff
and judgment entered in the lower court. Defendant appealed. Held, that
there was no duty on the part of the defendant's employees, under the cir-
cumstances, to assist the plaintiff in alighting, and that there was not
sufficient evidence to sustain the issue of the defective condition of the rubber
matting. Judgment reversed and entered in favor of the defendant. Chicago
etc. Ry Co. v. Wisdom (Tex., 1919), 216 S. W. 241.
The carrier must provide for the safe carriage of the passenger "as far as
human care and foresight will go." Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79; Stokes
v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. (U. S.) x8i. The carrier is also bound to provide safe
and convenient modes of access and egress from its vehicles, and will be
liable for negligence in this respect. W. & G. Ry. Co. v. Harmon, 147 U. S.
571; Traphagen v. Erie Ry. Co., 73 N. J. L. 759; McGee v. The Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co., 92 Mo. 208; Besecker v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 220 Pa. St. 507.
The usual rule in relation to boarding or alighting passengers is, that in the
absence of circumstances showing that a passenger requires assistance, there
is no duty to assist. Younglove v. Pullman Co., 207 Fed, 797; Burge v.
St. L. etc. Ry. Co., z93 Ill. App. 492; Hawes v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 192 Mass.
324; Selby v. Detroit Ry. Co., 122 Mich. 311; Hanlon v. N. J. Central Ry.
CO., 187 N. Y. 73. But see Dawdy v. Hamilton etc. Ry. Co., 5 Ont. L. 92,
contra. However where the carrier's employees render assistance, even where
it is not necessary, it will be liable for any negligence in this rendition.
Younglove v. Pullman Co., supra; Ray v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 163 Ia. 430;
Hanlon v. N. J. etc. Ry. Co., sypra; Werner v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 1o
Wis. 300; 17 MICH. L. REV. 270. While the above rules are correct as general
rules, they leave a large field open as to what circumstances will be sufficient
to raise a duty to assist a passenger in boarding or alighting from a railway
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car. In the case of an old, crippled, sick, or infirm passenger, where this
condition was apparent to the carrier's employees, or would be apparent
to them in the reasonable exercise of their duties, it becomes the duty of the
carrier to furnish assistance. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Lee, 37 Okla. 545;
Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Madden, 135 Ga. 2o5; Mitchell v. Ry. Co., x61 Ia.
ioo. Also it is the duty of the carrier to assist a passenger, where- he is
called upon to board or alight from a train away from the station, or at a
dangerous and unusual place. W. & A. Ry. Co. v. Voils, 98 Ga. 446; M. &
C. Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Cartw'ight v. Chicago & G. T. Ry.
Co., 5z Mich. 6o6. In Hasbrouck v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. Co., 202 N.
Y. 363, the court said, as dicta, that it was the duty of the carrier to assist
a woman in alighting, who was travelling with heavy hand luggage. Whether
or not it is negligence under all the circumstances, to fail to assist a passenger
in alighting, is a question of fact for the jury. Traction Co. v. Flory, 45
Tex. Civ. App. 233; So. Ry. Co. v. Reeves, 116 Ga. 743; Central of Ga. Ry.
Co. v. Madden, supra. The court in the principal case laid much stress on
these facts: that the paintiff was a healthy young woman accustomed to
travel, that she requested no assistance with her hand bag, and also that
women resent the laying of hands on their person under any pretense. In
view of the above cases it would seem that there was much force in the
dissenting opinion in holding that this was properly a question for the
jury, and should at the most, only reverse and remand the case for a new
trial, instead of rendering a judgment for the defendant in this court,
CARRIERS--TERMINATION OF RELATioN-AsSAULT BY MOToRMAN.-A negro
passenger who was getting off at the front end of a street-car refused to
close the door when told to do so by the motorman. The latter used lan-
guage which is somewhat deleted in the report, followed the negro a few
steps away from the car, and hit him over the head with the "controller."
Held, the company was not liable for the assault, since the relation of
carrier and passenger had been terminated. Willingham v. Birmingham Ry.
Lt. & Power Co., (Ala., 1919) 83 So. 95-
The weight of authority in this country is probably in accord with the
decision of the court. Hanson v. Urbana Ry., 75 IIl. App. 474; but see Wis.
v. Covington St. Ry. Co., 91 Ky, 537, contra. For discussion of the question
involved see x8 MicH. L. Rgv. 231; 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 764; 51 L. RK A.
(N.S.) 899; ANN. CAS. 1915 C 1223; Id., 1916 E 998.
DEOs--DLFV .Y-Grantor deposited deed with third person to keep
until the death of either grantor or grantee and then to deliver to the sur-
vivor. Held, delivery is not effectual for it was conditional and not abso-
lute. Stove v. Daily, (Cal., 1pi9) 185 Pac. 66s.
See supra, z8 MIcH. L. REv. 330.
DEEDS-DELIVERY To GRANTEE No' ABSOLUTE--In an action on a fire
insurance policy, it was contended by the insurance company that the policy
had become null and void because of the violation of the common provision
with reference to a change in title of the insured property. It appeared that
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plaintiff had prepared a deed of the premises to C. and had delivered same
to him. C. was a real estate broker and the purpose of the deed was to
enable him to effect a sale of the premises. It was held that the lower court
was right in concluding that in view of the circumstances under which the
('eed was delivered to C., there had been po change in ownership. Phillips
v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Mich., 1919), 175 N. W. 144.
The defendant relied upon Western Ins. Co. v. Riker, 1o Mich. 279, and
kindred cases "in which it is held that a deed absolute on its face, though
given as a security, avoids the policy." The court stated that "The distinc-
tion between the Riker case and the one at bar lies in the fact that, as found
by the trial judge, there was no present intent on the part of the parties to
pass any title to Chilson." No reference is made to the case of Wipflcr v.
Wipflcr, 153 Mich. iS, in which the court held that it was not competent
for the grantor to show by parol evidence that a deed handed to a grantee was
to be effective only in the case of the happening of a certain event. See the
discussion of this general subject in 18 MiCi. L. REv. 314. Though it does
not appear clearly from the report of the principal case, it is undoubtedly a
fair inference that it was the intention of the grantor that the deed to C.
should be effective as a conveyance to him in case he found a purchaser
for the premises. The deed to such purchaser was obviously intended to
run from C.
ELECTRICITY-DUTY TO INSULATE VIRES-PRoTECTION FOR CHILDREN
CLrrIaiNG TR-EEs.-Defendant power company maintained high-tension wires,
uninsulated, strung through trees. on plaintiff's premises, about 16 feet from
the ground. Plaintiff's minor son, in climbing one of these trees, came in
contact with a wire and was killed. Held, defendant was liable. Chickering
v. Lincoln County Power Co., (Me., i1I9) io8 AtI. 46o.
-The theory of the principal case was that defendant, whose structures
were erected under a statute and hence legal, was liable only for negligence.
The court did not proceed on the theory of "attractive nuisance" which had
ntot been followed in Maine. McMinn v. Telephone Co., 113 Me. 5ig. The
reasoning of the court seems in accord with the weight of authority. The
duty of an electric company in conveying a current of high potential, to
exercise commensurate care under the circumstances, requires it to insulate
its wires and to use reasonable care to keep same insulated. This duty has
been held to be limited to points where there is ground to apprehend that a
reasonably prudent person may come in close proximity with the wires. THE
LAW OF ELECTRICITY, CURTIS. § 5IO; Wetherbv v. Twin State Co.. 8.3 Vt. i8g.
Companies maintaining such lines are bound to recognize that petsons may
lawfully climb trees. McCrea v. Beverly Gas and Electric Co., 216 Mass. 495.
Companies are further charged with knowledge that swaying limbs will wear
the insulation off. CURTIS, supra, § 512; Brubaker v. Electric Light Co., 130
Mo. App. 439. Courts further recognize that children are apt to climb teees,
and impose on electric companies a duty to keep their high tension wires
insulated in places where children will come in contact with them. Temple
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v. McComb City Electric Light and Power Co., 89 Miss. I; Benton v. North
Carolina Public Service Corp., 165 N. C. 354; CURTIS, supra, § 512. An oppo-
site conclusion was reached where child had been warned not to climb tree
through which wire ran. Brown v. Panola L. and P. Co., 137 Ga. 352. The
fact that the child is not climbing trees on its parent's premises is not im-
portant, as child is not a trespasser against the electric company. Mullen v.
Wilkes-Barre Gas and Electric Co., 229 Pa. St. 54; if the child was trespass-
ing on the la nd of the electric company, latter could not be-held liable except
on the "attractive nuisance" theory. Wires carrying current, poles, and guy
wires are not generally placed in the class of "attractive nuisances," as they
are not inherently attractive to children and are generally placed out of
reach. See 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 122o and cases there cited; CURTIS, supra,
§§ 469, 470, 471. The basis of liability is, as stated above, founded on a duty
to protect "everyone who may be lawfully in proximity to its wires and
liable to come accidentally or otherwise in contact with them." Mullen v.
Wilkes-Barre Gas and Electric Co., supra. But the high degree of vigilance
required does not make electric companies insurers. In Adams v. Bullock,
125 N. E. 93 (N. Y.) a boy swung a wire eight feet long over the parapet
of a bridge. It came in contact with a trolley wire and the boy was burned.
The defendant company was held not liable, as "no vigilance, unless fortified
by the gift of prophecy, could have predicted the point where such an accident
would occur." See note to this case in 9o CENT. L. JouR. 125.
EMBEZZLEMENT-EvIDENCE OF INTENT.-The exclusion of testimony of
conversations tending to show absence of felonious intent, by defendant with
one not entitled by law to any part of the property alleged to have been
embezzled, and with a lawyer as to the legality of keeping it, offered byea de-
fendant charged with embezzlement as a bailee. Held, error. Lindgren v.
United States, (C. C. A., 9th Circ., 1919) 260 Fed. 772.
Gilbert, 3., dissented from this ruling. However, the underlying principle
is clear, "Any facts which go to explain the c.,'idition of a person's mind,-
when such condition is at issue, may be received." WHARTON ON EVIDENcE,
Sec. 254. Ross, J., giving the majority opinion of the court, cited only one
case in support, Stale v. Littschke, 27 Ore. i89, "conversion by the defendant
must have been with a felonious intention, and this was a question of fact
for the jury under all the circumstances of the case." 'Evidence that at the
time of the alleged embezzlement the accused was in debt and in need
of money is admissible to show motive, Govatos v. State, 42 S. E. 708, United
States v. Camp, io Pac. 226. Intent, whether proved directly or indirectly,
is the essence bf the crime. In the following cases, evidence of flight of
accused, Commonwealth v. Hurd, 123 Mass. 438; letters showing plan to
defraud, People v. Tomlinson, io2 Cal. 19; evidence that accused committed
offenses similar to that in question, People v. Gray, 66 Cal. 271; State v.
Pittam, 32 Wash. 137; was admitted to show intent. A defendant should
never have fewer facilities for proving innocence than the State has for prov-
ing guilt. Any evidence tending to prove lack of felonious intent should be
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allowed, providing it does not contravene other established evidentiary rules.
In Frank v. State, 55 Fla. 62, the defendant propounded several questions to
his witnesses to show that defendant had no criminal intent in his dealings
with money intrusted to him ag an agent Objections to these questions
being sustained, the court in review held the ruling error, stating the just
rule, "Some latitude is to be allowed, not only in proving the offense, but on
the other hand to show the bona fides of the accused."
INJUNCTION-MASTER AND SRVANT-INJuNcTION TO ENFORCE RESTRICTvE
COVENANTS.-Action to restrain former employee from entering the employ-
ment of another, in violation of a restrictive covenant that he would not work
for any competitor in the United States for two years after leaving dom-
plainant's service. The purpose of the complainant is to prevent the employee
from divulging trade secrets to the prospective employer. Held, agreement
was valid, and defendant should be restrained. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers
Film Products (Dec., I919), 179 N. Y. S. 325.
This is a reversal of the decision rendered in the Supreme Court in Sep-
tember, Igg, criticized in x8 MicH. L. Rzv. i6o. It was there pointed out that,
according to the better view, the defendant should have been restrained from
entering the employment of the competitors, because such restrictive covenants
are treated like similar covenants in restraint of trade connected with the sale
of business,--and the injunction generally issues regardless of the skill of the
employee. The Appellate Court, in trying to square its decision with that of
the Supreme Court, assumes that the defendant has acquired valuable trade
secrets through his employment, and also "that the mere rendition of service
along the line of his training would necessarily impart such knowledge to
some degree. Such an attempt on the part of the court seems needless, and
it might better have placed its decision on the ground that the granting of
the injunction was necessary, reasonable and equitable to protect the interest
of the covenantee, regardless of the employee's skill. Mahler Co. v. Mahler,
i6o App. Div. 548.
INSURANcE-AccDXNT-PRoX1MATE CAus--Where the insured, after un-
dergoing an operation for appendicitis, slipped from his pillow, and this
caused an embolus to separate from the wound, resulting in his death, held,
that the accident of slipping from the pillow was the proximate cause os
the death and that the insurer was liable on a policy insuring against death
by accidental means. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.Meldrim (Ga., 1919),
ioi S. E. 3o5.
The dissenting opinion took the position, that there is a material distinc-
tion between cases in which there is an independent injury merely aggravated
by an existing disease, and those, like the principal case, where the accident
only results from and relates to the disease. For a review of the cases on
this subject, see, 9 MIcn. L. RZV. 365, II MicH. L. Rzv. 486, and 17 Gs aN
BAG, 549.
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INSURANac-DE^TH BY ACCMENTAL MEAs.-Where the insured was en-
gaged in sorting marketable from unmarketable oranges and ate three of
them, which resulted in gastritis and caused his death, held, the death was
not by "accidental means" within the meaning of the terms of the policy.
The insured, from the nature of his occupation, was bound to know tne char-
acter of the oranges. Hence, the result only, and not the means could be
said to have been accidental. Martin v. Interstate Business Mens' Acc. Ass'n
(Iowa, ig9), 174 N. W. 577.
Where a physician had been attending a patient suffering from erysipelas,
and contracted the disease through an abrasion in the skin, held, that the re-
sulting death was not accidental within the terms of a policy which stipulated
for death resulting from "bodily injury sustained and effected directly through
external, violent, and accidental means, exclusively and independently G[
all other causes." Bell v. State Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis, (Ga., xpx9),
101 S. E. 541.
"Accidental means" has been defined as "those which produce effects
whiich are not their natural and probable consequence.' Western Conimercwsa
Travelers' Assn. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 4o, 4o5: or "anything which takes place
without the foresight or expectation acted upon or effected thereby," Railwa.V
Officials and Employees Accident Ass. Co. v. Drummond, 56 Nebr. 235, 241;
or, "an event without the aid and the design of the person and which is un-
foreseen," Paul v. Travelers Ins. Co., n12 N. Y. 472, 478: see also Northwe.t
Com. Travelers' Ass'n. v. London Guarantee and Acc. Co., io Manitoba L.
Rep. 537: or, "any event which takes place without the foresight or expec-
tation of the person acted upon or affected by the event is an accident within
the meaning of an insurance policy," Richards v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 89 Cal.
170, 175: or, the term when used in an insurance policy "is to be taken in its
ordinary, popular sense as meaning 'happening by chance, unexpectedly taking
place, not according to the usual course of things, or not expected'" Dozier
v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 46 Fed. 446, 448. Under these definitions the
courts have not seen fit to catalogue death due to sunstroke as due to acci-
dental means, Dozier case supra; Continental Casualty Co. v. Pittman, 145
Ga. 641. However, in Higgins v-Midland Casualty Co., 281 Ill. 43! (16 MIcH.
L. Rzv. 453 and- 13 ILL. L. Rzv. 133) the court held that where the policy
insured against death due to an injury caused by an accident and that sun-
stroke should be such an injury, the insured might recover. See also Bryant
v. Continental Casualty Co., (xpi6) io7 Tex. 582, commented on in 16 COL. L.
Rzv. 426. Nor the taking of an overdose of morphine where deceased knew
at the time the quantity he was taking, Cames v. Iowa Traveling Men's Asso.,
io6 Iowa 281: nor where the policy exempted the company from liability for
death by poisoning where death was caused by eating spoiled oysters, whether
they were poisonous or not, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hudgins, 97 Tex. 124.
In Johnson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., (Ig5) 184 Mich. 406, in the absence
of such provision, the Michigan court found death due to poisoning to have
been the result of an accident. For criticism of this case, see 13 Mxcu. L. Rcv.
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705. The voluntary taking of deleterious matter into the body in ignorance
of its probable or possible effect seems to be considered as the unforeseen
result of a contemplated act. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the means
(the thing insured against) is not accidental. The court in the principal case
is apparently sustained in its position though the results seem unnecessarily
harsh.
INSURANCE-MURDER OF INSURED BY BENEFIcLARY-RECOV-RY By ADMINIS-
TRATOR WHERE MURDERER WILL BE SOLE DlsTmu'rEE.-The beneficiary in a
life insurance policy murdered the insured and assigned all her rights under
the policy. Defendant company refused to pay the policy either to the bene-
ficiary, to the assignee, or to the administrator of the estate of the insured.
The administrator sued. Insured left no children and, under statutes of the
state, the murderess would be the sole distributee of the money, if recovered
from the defendant. Held, that since it is against the policy of our law to
allow one to gain from the commission of a crime, the beneficiary could not
have recovered; nor could the assignee who acquired no more rights than the
beneficiary had; nor can the administrator recover when the murderess will
be the sole distributee of the recovery. Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
(W. Va., 1919) Ioo S. E. 865.
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy who intentionmly kills the insured
forfeits all rights under the policy. N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong,
I17 U. S. 59,; 14 HARv. L. RsZv. 375; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 98
Ark. 132; Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Weigh tman (Okla., gi6) i6o Pac.
629. When the alleged murderer has not been prosecuted, the burden is upon
the party asserting that the insured was murdered to prove it by a preponder-
ance of evidence, but not beyond a reasonable doubt. Prather v. Michigan
Mut. L. Ins. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 11368. The killing must have been intentional,
as well as criminal, so if the beneficiary were insane, no rights are forfeited,
Holdom v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 159 IlL 619; nor if death
of insured were caused by the negligence of the beneficiary, Schreiner v. High
Court of IlL C. 0. F., 35 Il. App. 576. No person claiming through the crim-
inal beneficiary can recover under the policy. Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Ass'n., I1892] 1 Q. B. 147; Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n., 112 Iowa 41
(heirs); Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Weightman, supra (assignees).
However, the loss by the beneficiary of his rights does not exempt the insurer
from liability under the policy, for in the absence of an alternative beneficiary,
the personal representative of the insured can enforce a resulting trust in
favor of the estate of the insured against the insurer. Sharpless -i. Grand
Lodge, 135 -Minn. 35; Schmidt v. Northern Life Assn., supra. But (as held
in the principal case) if, under the statute of distribution and descent, the
murderer would be the sole distributee of the recovery, the administrator
will not be allowed to recover. McDonald v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 178 Iowa
863. It seems notable that, although the courts will not allow a criminal to
benefit through the medium of a contract, the great majority of courts hold
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that, in the absence of statute providing that murderers shall not inherit the
property of their victims, they can not except murderers from the operation
of statutes of descent and distribution. Such courts concede the bad policy
of allowing a murderer to inherit the property of his victim, but they deem
themselves powerless to interfere with the statutory devolution ot property.
McAllister v. Pair. 72 Kans. 533; Shellenborger v. Ransom, 41 Nebr. 631;
Owens v. Owens, ioo N. C. 242; In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. St. 203; 4
MICH. L. REv. 653. Contra: Perry v. Strawbridge, 2o9 Mo. 621. See 7
MICH. L. REV. 71; 8 HARv. L. R.v. 170; 27 Id. 280 Also Ellerson v. West-
cott, 148 N. Y. 149, holding that the murderer acquires legal title by descent,
but equity will compel him to hold it as trustee ex inaleficio for the rcpresen-
tative of his victim. See also 36 A--.i. LAw RE,. & Rrv. (N.S.) 225; 64 U. oF
PA. L. Rev. 307; lVellner v. Eckstein, 105 Minn. 444; 7 Micii. L. REv. i6o.
Statutes have obviated the effect of the doctrine of the weight of authority
at least in some states. See Matter of Kuhn, 725 Iowa 449; Beddinafield v.
Estill, 118 Tenn. 39. On the various phases of the subject-matter involved in
the principal case, see L. R. A. 1917 B, 67o; 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 726; 2 Aii. &
ENG. ANN. CAs. 658; 14 Id. 99.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEGALIrY OP Puaposx-RtNr.--Plaintiff seeks to
recover rent for premises leased to the defendant for saloon purposes. The
lease contained a provision that the business should be conducted in accord-
ance with the laws of Illinois and the ordinances of the city of Chicago, and
gave the lessee the right to terminate the lease if the state Sunday closing law
should be generally enforced in Chicago. Held, that the latter provision does
not invalidate the lease which contemplates no violation of the law. Hoefeld
v. Ocello, (111., 1919) 125 N. E. 5.
The general rule seems to be that mere knowledge of the seller of goods
or of the vendor or lessor of property that the buyer or lessee intends an
illegal use of them is no defense to an action for the price or rent. Armfieid
v. Tate. 29 N. C. 258 (premises leased for house of prostitution) ; Brunswick
etc. Co. v. Valleau, 50 Iowa 120 (for gambling purposes) ; Goodall v. Gerbe
Brewing Co., 56 Ohio St. 257 (for unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors). It
has often been asserted that in order to defeat a recovery it must be shown
that the seller or lessor participated in some degree, however slight, in the
wrongful intent and purpose. Shirley v. Silvers, 539 Iowa 605; Tracy v.
Talmage, 14 N. Y. 16z As to what will amount to such participation, "the
law finds itself in close quarters." An act such as marking liquor casks to
avoid detection has been held sufficient. Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 655. Or a
sale of furniture for use in a bawdy house. Furniture Co. v. Van Alstine, 22
Wash. 67o. Again it has been said that if the lessor not only knew but ex-
pected that liquor would be sold on the premises in violation of law, the con-
tract is void. Mound v. Barker, 71 Vt. 253. To the same effect is Graves v.
Johnson, 156 Mass. 211, where the seller of liquor not only knew but expected
and desired that it would be unlawfully sold. An insurance on goods known
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to be kept in violation of the excise laws is part of an illegal transaction tend-
ing to the safer carrying on of the same and void. Kelly v. Home Ins. Co.,
97 Mass. 288. In the instant case such participation in the unlawful intent is
apparently insufficient to taint the contract with illegality. The court refused
to admit evidence that the lease was made with the understanding that the
Sunday closing law was to be violated. But such evidence has been held
admissible even where the lease, as in this case, contained an express covenant
that the premises should not be used for an unlawful purpose. Demartini v.
Anderson, 127 Cal. 33, Plath v. Kline, 18 N. Y. App. Div. 24o. Such evidence
does not vary the lease but shows that it was wholly illegal and void. Mound
v. Barker, supra; Dougherty v. Seymour, i6 Colo. 289.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-IMPUTING INELIGIBILITY TO HOLDER OF PUBLIC OFFICE
oF PRoFiT.-During the plaintiff's term in the State Senate, the defendants
procured the publication of a false article in many of the state newspapers.
Among the var:3us charges against the plaintiff were several accusing him of
holding office illegally. The state constitution made citizenship a requisite
for eligibility, and this article charged that he was not a citizen of the United
States. It also charged that he had violated the state constitution by holding
the office of bank examiner, which the constitution provided he .was not quali-
fied to hold. For these various disqualifications, the defendants as signers of
the article, demanded his resignation. Defendants' demurrer admitted the
charges were false, and that they were maliciously published; but they claim
this is not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Held, imputations like
those contained in this article are libelous per se. Englund v. Townley et al.,
(N. D., igig) 174 N. W. 755.
As a general rule, any words written of one holding an office of profit,
charging ineligibility, Incapacity, corruption or lack of integrity in office are
libelous per se, on the theory that they render one's tenure of office precarious,
and consequently are to one's pecuniary disadvantage. Children v. Shinn . 168
Ia. 531. The court, in the instant case, supported this rule by holding these
written charges, of ineligibility and unfitness, against the incumbent of an
office of profit are libelous per se. A direct precedent is found in MacInnis
v. National Herald Printing Co., 14o Minn. 171, where a written charge that
an incumbent of an office, and a candidate for re-election, is not a citizen,
when citizenship is a requisite for eligibility, is libelous per se. For a review
of the authorities on this point, see L. R. A. 1918 E. 27. Generally spoken
words are actionable only when they impute a crime; but even spoken words.
imputing incap, ty to an incumbent of an office of profit, are actionable.
Gave v. Biethen, 21 Minn. 8o. A distinction is generally recognized in cases
of imputation of incapacity in regard to the holding of an office of honor or
credit only; and in such cases the words are not actionable per se, but only
if the conduct charged is such as to subject the incumbent to removal from
office. Alexander v. Jenkins [i892] x Q. B. 8oz.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NoN-LIABILITY FOR EXERCISE or GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION IN REvUSING BUILDING PEaMIr.-X's application for a building
permit in defendant city having been denied by its inspector of buildings, X
brought mandamus proceedings against the officer and the city to compel the
issuance of such permit, and prevailed. Defendants appealed, and, by agree-
ment between the parties, a stay of all proceedings was entered; in this agree-
ment it was stipulated that the filing of cost and supersedeas bonds was waived
by X, "without waiving right to costs and damages to which he would be
entitled if such bonds had been given." The order of the court below was
affirmed on appeal, the permit was granted, and X erected the building. X
now sues the city and its building inspector for damages for delay in the
building operations. Held, that there could be no recovery. Roerig v. Hough-
ton, (Minn., 1919) 175 N. W. 542.
It has been held that a municipal corporation is not liable for damages
sustained by reason of a wrongful revocation of a building permit (Lerch v.
Duluth, 88 Minn. 295), or of a license to exhibit a circus (Kansas City v.
Lemen, 57 Fed. 9o5), but that the appropriate remedy is by injuncticn (Stev-
ens v. Muskegon, III Mich. 72, dictum).The reason given is that the act com-
plained of was within the scope of governmental functions, since the police
regulations of a city are made and enforced in the interests of the public.
Claussen v. Luverne, io3 Minn. 491. See the collection of cases in 18 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 4o9 and in 34 L. R. A. (N.S.) 141. As to the liability of the inspector,
the general rule is that a public officer cannot be held responsible in damages
for the honest exercise of his judgment within his jurisdiction, however
erroneous that judgment may be, provided he was acting judicially (Randall
v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523), or quasi-judicially (Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass.
547), but there is no exemption if he acts in a ministerial capacity (McCord
v. High, 24 Ia. 336). The character of the act, rather than the character of
the office, is the basis of the exemption. Wall v. Trunbull, 16 Mich. 228. In
the instant case DiB.EL, J., dissented on the ground that this was'an action on
contract, which the city could not escape.
PLEADING-PLEA IN ABATEMENT--CODE.-In conformity with Code Civ.
Proc., N. Y., Sec. 498, which permits facts in abatement to be pleaded in the
answer, together with defenses on the merits, it was held that the judgment
of a federal court in that state for the plaintiff on a plea in abatement, which
raised an issue of fact as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the defendant, should be that the defendant answer over. Phil. & Reading
Coal & Iron Co. v. Kever, (C. C. A., 2d Circ., 1919) 26o Fed. 534.
For an excellent discussion of the incongruities and inconsistencies of
present-day pleading in this matter of defenses in abatement and in bar, see
Sheppard v. Graves, 14 How. 505, 509, 51o. At common law where there was
judgment for plaintiff on an issue of fact joined on a plea in abatement, the
judgment was quod recuperet, Brown v. Ill. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ill. 366;
if on an issue of law, that the defendant answer over. The reason for this
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difference was that courts looked upon dilatory pleas with ill favor, and held
a plea in abatement raising an issue of fact to be an admission of the merits
of the plaintiff's claim. GOULD'S PL. c. 2, s. 37; 1 CuTrTY's PL. 440. Under
Code Procedure, the reason for this rule of judgment of quod recuperet has
ceased to exist, in cases where defenses both in abatement and in bar are
pleaded in the same answer. Under the code, as said in Thompson v. Green-
wood, 28 Ind. 327, 332, "there is no authority for more than one answer, nor
for more than one trial upon issues of fact. Every ground of defence must be
stated in the same answer." It is technically possible for courts administering
the code to adhere to the common law rule in cases where the answer in
abatement happens to appear alone, Thompson v. Greenwood, 28 Ind. 327;
Bond v. Wagner, 28 Ind. 462; but it is more logical to refuse to render a
judgment on the merits upon a plea in abatement under any circumstances,
and this would seem most nearly in harmony with the liberal spirit of the
code.
PUBLIC OFFICERS-PAYMENT TO A DE FACTO OFFICER A DEFENSE To SUIT
FOR SALARY BY Dz JURE O"cEa.-Plantiff had regularly held position of city
attorney since July 6, 1914. He contends that before his term of office was
properly concluded, K was appointed to this office,-April 17, x916, and the
latter proceeded to perform the duties of the office, and was recognized as
such, as well as paid the salary appertaining to this office. The plaintiff's
action is for salary-from April 17, x96, to Aug. 1, i916. Held: Payment to
de facto officer of salary for time actually spent in performance of his duties
is a complete defense to a suit for same by the de jure officer. Wzlkerson v.
City of Albuquerque, (N. Mex., igig) I85 Pac. 547.
In the first place -the court in the case at hand refuses to adjudicate the
rightful title to this office in such an action as the present, to which K, the
present holder of YWe office, is not a party. There seems to be adequate
authority for this. MECHEM PUBLIC OFFICERS, § 330, Walden v. Town of
Headland, 156 Ala. 562. Such title cannot be determined in an action by the
former occupant for his salary. Thus, without deciding the de jure title, the
court proceeds, apparently assuming K to be a de facto holder of the office.
The payment of salary to K for the period in question was held to be a com-
plete bar to any action for same by the plaintiff; further, that the plaintiff's
remedy, if any, was to secure an adjudication of his title in a proper action,
and then sue K for the amount received by him. The principle here laid down
seems to be established law, in so far as salary actually paid to the de facto
officer is concerned. See Dolan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 274; MECHEM, PUBLIC
OFFICERS, § 332. This seems to be based on the right of the disbursing officer
to rely on the apparent title of the de facto officer, (see case last cited), and on
this alone. A rather anomalous situation is presented by such cases, for, by
the weight of authority as well as reason, it seems that a de facto officer,
though he has actually performed the services in question and though there
be no other claimant, cannot successfully maintain an action for his salary.
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For a full discussion of this latter phase of the subject see articles in io
MicH. L. Rzv., pp 178 and 291. This right to compensation appears to rest
upon the title to the office, as a kind of qualified property right, and not upon
a claim for services performed, (see articles last cited, supra) ; and, at least
from one point of view, it seems rather illogical that the rightful holder of
such title could thus be deprived by payment to another. Perhaps the con-
sideration of public policy involved in the reliance of the disbursing officer
upon the apparent title can justify this.
REsiTRciIV COVENANTS-ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFIT BY OPERTiON or LAW--
RIGHT or ExEcuTORS oF COVENANTEE TO Sue.-Tn an action by the ececutors
of a covenantee, one of whom was also the devisee of the covennntee's re-
maining estate, for the violation of restrictive covenants by an assignee of
the covenantor, held, that although there could have been no recovery in either
separate capacity the covenants could be enforced by the plaintiffs since they
represented both the real and personal estates of the covenantee. Ives v.
Brown, [1919] 2 Ch. 314.
Although the burden of a covenant of this sort is almost universally in-
tended by the original covenanting parties to bind the land of the covenantor
into whomsoever hands it comes, the same cannot be said with eclual certainty
as to the devolution of the benefit of the covenant. Where lots are sold in
accordance with a general building plan, subject to restrictive covenants it is
ordinarily intended that each of the purchasers should benefit by the agree-
ment, in which case the right to enforce such covenants enures to the land
of each purchaser and passes to his assigns. Mann, v. Stephens, i5 Sim. 377;
Cole v. Sims, 5 D. M. & G. I; dictum in Renals v. Cowlishaw (878), 9 Ch.
D. 125, iI Ch. D. 866. Otherwise an assignee of a portion of the covenantee's
retained estate does not get the benefit of the restrictive covenants by a bare
conveyance when there is nothing further to define the property for the benefit
of which they were entered into. Kcateg v. Lyon, (1869) L. R- 4 Ch. 218;
Renals v. Cowlishaw, supra. The mere additional fact that the "assigns" of
the covenantee are included in the original conveyance to the covenantor, is
not enough to show an intent to benefit subsequent purchasers from the cove-
antee. Everett v. Remington, [1892] 2 Ch. 148. In order to enable the pur-
chaser as an assignee (such purchaser not being an assign of ail that the
vendor retained when he executed the conveyance containing the covenantz,
and that conveyance not showing that the benefit of the covenants was in-
tended to enure to each portion of the estate so retained or to the portion
of the estate of which the purchaser is the assignee) to claim the benefit of
a restrictive covenant, it must at least appear that the benefit of the cove-
nant was part of the subject-matter of the purchase. R,'nals v. Cowclishaw.
supra. But where the original conveyance states that the covenant was cntcred
into with the intent to benefit the purchasers, heirs and assigns of the remain-
ing tract, the benefit of the covenant becomes annexed to each and every part
if the land included and passes by assignment, whether or not its existence
was known to the purchaser or formed any part of the consideration. Rogers
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v. Hosegood, [igool 2 Ch. 388. In the principal case, the devise of the cove-
nantee's remaining estate to the plaintiff did not amount to an assignment of
the benefit of the covenant under any of the tests previously considered. How-
ever, a assignee of land in connection with which restrictive covenants have
been given can successfully enforce the covenants if he is also an assignee of
the benefit of these covenants although their benefit has not been so definitely
attached to the land as to pass by mere conveyance. Renals v. Cowlishazu,
supra. The principal case holds that, since the benefit can be expressly as-
signed it can be assigned by operation of law and, since the covenantee could
have restrained such a breach at the time of her death, as the beneficial owner
of the property so retained, the same right may be exercised by those repre-
senting together both her real and personal estate. Where the executor
represents the personal estate alone and the covenantee has retained none of
the original estate, the former has no right of action for a breach occurring
after the death of the latter. Formby v. Barker, [1903] 2 Ch. 539. Therefore,
the plaintiffs in the principal case could have prevailed only in their dual
capacity.
SALEs-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO ONE NOT IN PRIViTY op CONTRACT
FOR INJURIOUS FOOD PRODucTs.-The defendant packing company sold sausage
to an intermediate retail dealer, who sold to the plaintiff, whose wife died
from ptomaine poisoning alleged to have been caused from eating this saus-
age. The court, upon motion of the defendant, compelled the plaintiff to elect
to proceed either upon the theory of implied warranty, or upon negligence,
and he elected to stand upon negligence. Judgment below for the defendant,
without submission to the jury on the ground that no negligence was shown.
Held, that it was proper for the court to compel such election, and that while
there might have been a recovery upon the basis of negligence, there could not
be upon the basis of implied warranty, because there was no privity of con-
tract. Drury v. Armour & Co., (Ark., I919) 216 S. W. 40.
It seems to be a well settled doctrine at the present time that the ultimate
consumer may bring his action directly against the manufacturer .or packer
for injuries from the use of unwholesome food, though there was no contract
relation between the parties. Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748;
Salmon v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 219 Ill. 421; Roberts v. Annheuser Busch
Brewing Assoc., 211 Mass. 449; Wilson v. Ferguson Co., 214 Mass. -65; Haley
v. Swift & Co., 152 Wis. 570; Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322; Ma-
.etti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 213 (note); Mesh-
besher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., io7 Minn. 104; Watson v. Augusta
Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121. The only difficulty in the above rule is to ascer-
tain upon what basis the action is predicated. As in the principal case, many
courts have held that it cannot be based upon contract for the breach of an
implied warranty, because there is no privity of contract between the con-
sumer and the manufacturer, when a retailer intervenes. Nelson v. Armour
& Co., 76 Ark. 352; Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., supra (saying they will
assume without deciding, that there is no implied warranty); Roberts v
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Annheuser Busch Brewing Assoc., supra. Some courts have put it on the
ground of the negligence of the manufacturer, implied from the violation of
the pure food statute, under the general rule giving a private right of action
against the wrongdoer for injuries sustained from a violation-of the statute.
Salmon v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, supra; Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil &
Mfg. Co., supra. Others have placed the liability for furnishing defective
provisions, which endanger human life, on the same ground as the manufac-
turing of patent or proprietary medicine. Tomlinson v. Armour & Co.,
supra; Roberts v. Annheuser Busch Brewing Assoc., supra; Wilson v. Fer-
guson Co., supra; Haley v. Swift & Co., supra; Parks v. Pie Co., 93 Kan.
334; Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, io6 Miss. 864; Boyd v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 23; Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Can-
non, 132 Tenn. 419. One court has rested the liability upon the principle that
the original delivery of the article is wrongful and that everyone is respon-
sible for the natural consequences of his wrongful acts. Weiser v. Holzman,
33 Wash. 87. In another case the Federal court said, "the remedies of the
injured consumer ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the
law of sales, The obligation of the manufacturer should not be based alone
upon privity of.contract. It should rest upon the demands of social justice."
Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 2oo Fed. 322. However one case supports the view
of an implied warranty, which runs with the goods, and allows a recovery on
that ground. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., supra. In that case the court said,
"a manufacturer of food products under modern conditions impliedly war-
rants his goods, when dispensed in original packages, and that such warranty
is available to all who may be-damaged by their use in the legitimate channels
of trade." The same argument was relied on in the dissenting opinion of the
principal case, namely, that an implied warranty should run with the prop-
erty. However the weight of authority numerically seems to be, that such re-
covery is based on the theory of negligence and not on breach of contract
as contended for in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., supra, and in the dissenting
opinion in the principal case. As to the liability of the retailer for implied
warranty of provisions, see 17 MICH. L. Rzv. 192; and as to implied warranty
of wholesomeness in general, see 16 MicH. L. Rgv. 555.
TonRs-RiGHr 'to PmivAcy.-Plaintiff's name and picture were published
in defendant's motion pictures as pictorial ners. Picture was a truthful one
taken while plaintiff was engaged in solving a ,famous murder mystery of
extreme interest to the public and which had been featured together with
plaintiff's aid in its solution by all the daily papers at the time. Suit is
brought for alleged violation of the right to privacy under a New York
statute prohibiting the use of a person's name or picture without consent in
writing for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade and giving the
injured person a cause of action for injuries suffered and exemplary damages.
Held that statute did not prohibit the publication of a picture or name without
written consent in a set of films of actual events as a matter of current
news. Ilumiston v. Universal Film Co., (N. Y., i99) 178 N. Y. S. 752.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
The theory that a person has a right of privacy for the violation of which
a cause of action accrues is one of recent development and was advanced for
the first time in 4 HAv. L. R~v. 193. This right was first unequivocally recog-
nized by the courts as independent from any property right or libelous repre-
sentations in the case of Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. z9o and this case has been followed in Kentucky and New Jersey.
Foster-Millburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424; 8 MIcH. L. Rv. 2z; Edison v.
Edison Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136. Contra, Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co., i71 N. Y. 538; Henry v. Cherry, 3o R. I. 13; Corell v. Wall,
22 T. L. Rep. 532. See Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372. The New
York court in the majority opinion refused to recognize the existence of the
right to privacy in the case above cited, and that decision furnished the occasion
of the enactment of the statute which formed the basis of the principal case.
The decision is important in limiting the application of a prior case under the
same statute, Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 2io N. Y. 5i, where the plaintiff's heroic
act at sea was reproduced by actors under the plaintiff's name and formed the
nucleus of a picture drama and where a recovery was allowed. In the prin-
cipal case a distinction is made between an actual picture of news value dis-
tributed as a news item and a representation by actors dressed to resemble
the plaintiff in order to enhance the value of a story which admittedly was
only a fiction. To allow a recovery in the former case would be to make a
newspaper liable for all news published without the consent of the person
featured, a result obviously not intended by the legislature in view of the cir-
cumstances under which the statute was enacted. On the right of privacy
generally see 18 Ann. Cas. 1017, 2 Ann. Cas. 574, Ann. Cas. x915 B, 1027, 12
Co. L. REv. 693.
WILLs-GIET OvxR UPON DEATH op P.RWvous T.AER WITHOUT CHILDREN.-
After directing by will that a sum of money be placed in trust for the benefit
of each of his three children, and that if any child died without issue, the
fund should become part of the residue, the testator gave part of the residue
to his wife and the rest of the residue to his three children equally, "provided
* * * that if either of my children shall die without leaving a living child gr
children, then the share of such child shall become the property of the sur-
vivor or survivors, it being my intention that the surviving child * * * or
children shall have the whole balance of my estate." One of the children, a
son, died childless after the death of the testator, and his widow claims his
share of the residue. It was held that she was not entitled to her deceased
husband's share, but that it went to the testator's surviving children. In re
Peavey's Esate (Minn., gig), 175 N. W. io5.
There is apparently a conflict of authority on the point here involved.
Some courts adopt the rule that a will making a devise over upon the death
of the first taker is to be understood to refer to the death of the first taker
if it occurs within the life of the testator, but if the first taker survives the
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testator, then the devised estate vests in him absolutely; provided, however,
that if the testator's intent clearly appears to be otherwise, that intention will
be given -effect. Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248; Lawlor v. Holohan, 70 Conn.
87. Other authorities seem to lean the other way. Britton v. Thornton, 112
U. S. 526. It must be remembered, however, that in most cases there are
controlling circumstances. It is submitted that the Minnesota court in the
instant case applied the above proviso to the rule. The Indiana court did
likewise in Moore v. Gary, 149 Ind. 5i. The same rules apply equally to
devises of realty as to bequests of personalty. Dictum in Fcrguson v. Thom-
ason, 87 Ky. 5,9, 524. At first glance the principal holding might seem not
to harmonize with the classification laid down by Sir John Romilly in Ed-
wards v. Edwards, i5 Beav. 357 (this case coming within his second class),
but there is no conflict when his language is considered as a whole, for he
supplements his views on this class by saying that "all these cases are of
course liable to be varied by the force of particular expressions * * *, import-
ing a different intention." Another reason for the result in the case at bar
is that courts will have regard for the common desire of men to favor, with
their bounty, their-own kin. For an elaborate review of the authorities oa
this vexatious question see the note in 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) io45.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--"OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT"
-AccIDENT ON WAY TO WORm.-An employee was run over by a train on his
way to work. He was crossing a railroad track by a commonly used path at
a point 20 feet from the entrance of his employer's place of business. Held,
the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. Judscn Mfg.
Co. et. al. v. Industrial Accident Commission, et. al., (Cal., igig) 184 Pac.
-1.
An employee was the manager of a piano company which rented offices
on the fourth floor of a building. He entered the building on Sunday, con-
trary to the rules of the lessors, but for the purpose of transacting his em-
ployers' business, and attempted to operate a passenger elevator to ,each the
fourth floor. He fell into the shaft, and was injured. Held, the accident
arose out of the employment and was conpensable under the same statute as
the Judson case, supra. Starr Piano Co. et. al. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion, et al., (Cal., igIg) 184 Pac. 86o.
An accident to a workman on the way to work is not ordinarily in the
course of employment. HONNOLD, WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION, p. 358. A for-
tiori, it does not arise out of the employment. The fact that the accident did
not occur on the premises of the employer may preclude recqvery. DeCon-
stantin v. Pub. Serv. Co., 75 W. Va. 32. Even though the employee is on
the premises of the employer on his way to work, recovery has been denied.
Walters v. Coal Co., io5 L. T. N. S. ug, (foot path across employer's field) ;
Byrket v. L. S. & M. S. R. R., 29 Ohio C. C. 614, (section hand walking on
right of way). On the other hand, recovery has been allowed where the em-
ployer did not own or co ntrol the locus of the accident. Sundine's Case,
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218 Mass. i. The proximity of the place of accident to the place of employ-
ment seems to be the test approved in the two principal cases, as in Sundine's
Case, supra. But see Ocean Accident etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., z73 Cal.
313; Nelson Co. v. Commision, 286 Ill. 632, (contra). For general discussion
see 16 MicH. L. R~v. 179, 462; also 15 Id. 6o6; 17 Id. x95, 280; 65 U!PA. L.
REv. 8o; 16 COL. L. RPv. 267; 29 H~av. L. REv. 752.
